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Eisenhower On TV, like Khrushchov in East Berlin, Adopts Moderate Line, See Page 4

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On This Business of Surprise Attack

Two interrelated fallacies are being sold the American people by the formidable public relations, i.e. propaganda, machine at the disposal of our government. One is that aerial reconnaissance in another nation's airspace is no different from ordinary espionage. The other is that this can protect us from surprise attack. The first proposition has already been subjected to counter-attack as contrary to international law and common sense; penetration of another country's skies is a form of *invasion*, very risky in a time when the two great powers sit with thermonuclear triggers cocked.

The other proposition, however, has passed unchallenged. The picture created in our minds by propaganda is that of a brave American aviator peering down on the Soviet Union so he can notify us at once if he sees a surprise attack coming. It is implied that our national survival depends on such surveillance; that it inhibits the Soviet Union from attacking; and that, as such, aerial reconnaissance performs a public service to all the world, preventing war from breaking out. Thus the U-2, as our public relations experts portray it, is practically Picasso's dove of peace, in a technologically perfected form.

It Began With the Baruch Plan

Let us put aside the question of just what we do when we know that a surprise attack is on the way; time in which to retaliate in mutual suicide is hardly a form of assuring national survival. Let us address ourselves only to the question of whether aerial reconnaissance is, indeed, a means of detecting surprise attack. An examination of the literature on the subject does not support the dazzling oversimplified publicity gimmick of "open skies" as a guaranty of a peaceful world. Aerial reconnaissance has a part to play some day in a system of world law and world disarmament but by itself is no guaranty against surprise attack. The idea of such reconnaissance as a policing action was first put forward in the Baruch plan for a world atomic energy authority in 1946. There it was said that "aerial surveys" would be "particularly useful for determining the existence or non-existence of industrial installations in an area in which clandestine activities are suspected" but it was added that "direct ground inspection" would be needed "to determine accurately the character of the operations."

Despite much technological progress in photography and reconnaissance, this remains the situation today. The fullest and most expert international discussion of the problem occurred at the 1958 East-West conference in Geneva on means of preventing surprise attack. The final report made public at the United Nations January 5, 1959, shows the limitations of aerial reconnaissance. In Annex 6, a paper submitted by the Western experts, one finds that cloudy weather,* night-time and camouflage can hamper such surveillance. This document also speaks of "the inherent delay in converting photographic data to useful information" and Annex 13, another Western document, says "to make aerial search techniques effective they must be complemented by observation on the ground. Ground observers verify the information received from aerial search and provide the best means of critical observation of intentions or indications which in turn would provide warning of any surprise attack." This seems painfully slow when compared with our Buck Rogers comic strip picture of a Powers triumphantly radioing back an instant warning from over Sverdlovsk before the enemy can press the button.

The Eisenhower "open skies" proposal was first put forward as a public relations dazzler at the first summit conference in 1955. It was the handiwork of a psychological warfare group headed by Nelson Rockefeller. The most deflating postscript to it may be found in the Rockefeller Brothers Report on *International Security: The Military Aspect* three years later in which Nelson Rockefeller participated. "There is no doubt," the report says, "that the danger of surprise attack contributes to the tensions of the nuclear age. But with evolving technology it is questionable whether

(*Continued on Page Two*)

Despite That Iron Curtain

"We do know where their major air bases are; where their major government control centers are; where their air defense centers are; where their sensitive industrial centers are; where their gasoline refineries and storage sites are," i.e., in the Soviet Union.

—Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Feb. 17, 1959, before the House Appropriations Committee on the 1960 Defense Budget, Part 1, P. 840.

"The United States will have, in the 1959 fiscal year, something like 4,000 to 5,000 aircraft, each capable of carrying a thermonuclear weapon of megaton range. . . . Collectively, this represents a tremendous factor of safety, and a gigantic 'over-kill' capacity. There are less than 200 cities with populations of more than 50,000 in the Soviet Union; of these, many are . . . inconsequential. There are actually no more than about 60 to 100 prime targets. . . . Thus, the United States has today the theoretical capability of wiping out each prime target in Soviet Russia 40 to 50 times."

—Hanson W. Baldwin: The Great Arms Race, pps. 39-42.

*** "The USSR is enveloped in clouds far more than the United States; in some parts of Russia there are only two or three clear days a year," Philip W. Quigg, "Open Skies and Open Space," Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Oct. 1958.**

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Target-Finding and Muscle-Flexing Are the Real Functions of the U-2

(*Continued from Page One*)

aerial inspection will significantly reduce the element of surprise . . . even a foolproof inspection system will tell largely what is already known: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a devastating attack on very short notice and with a minimum of warning."

Second Use of the "Open Skies" Gimmick

The current debate at the United Nations represents the second time we have trotted out the "open skies" gimmick in that forum in reply to Russian alarms. The first occasion was in 1958 when an inaccurate United Press report implied that SAC bombers loaded with thermonuclear weapons wing out over the Arctic toward Russia frequently in response to "ghosts" on our radar warning screens. Then, too, we suggested that if the Russians were really worried about surprise attack, they ought to accept the President's open skies proposal. One of the Air Force's own Rand Corporation scholars, Albert Wohlstetter, commented on this suggestion in *Foreign Affairs* for January 1959, that it "conceals an absurdity." Writing on "The Delicate Balance of Terror," he said "Aerial photography would have its uses in a disarmament plan—for example, to check an exchange of information on the location of ground bases. However, so far as surprise is concerned, an 'open skies' plan would have direct use only to discover attacks requiring much more lengthy, visible and unambiguous preparations than are likely today. . . . Not even the most advanced reconnaissance equipment can disclose an intention from 40,000 feet. Who can say what the men in the blockhouse of an ICBM base have in mind? Or, for that matter, what is the final destination of training flights or fail-safe flights starting over the Pacific or North Atlantic from staging areas?"

At present, in my own opinion, for whatever it may be worth, we are much more heavily armed than the Soviet Union and could smash it many times over if we wanted. No Iron Curtain can hide the major targets for thermonuclear destruction. These, as General White's testimony in the box on page one indicates, are known to us. There are, after all, maps of Russia and the position of Moscow is not a military secret. We have our own agents in the Soviet Union, too. What we don't know, as General White went on to say in that same appearance before the House Appropriations Committee, are the sites of Russia's new intercontinental ballistic missiles. Unless these could be smashed first, the Soviet Union could retaliate in deadly form against an attacker. This is what deters even our advocates of preventive war. We might "overkill" the Soviets 40 to 50 times as Hanson Baldwin points out but they could wreak havoc on our cities and cripple our country in return. If we could pin-point their missile bases, the way would be clear for preventive war, for a first strike from *our* side. This is why the Russians fear aerial reconnaissance and this is how it threatens to upset that delicate balance of terror.

All That New Spy-in-the-Sky Can Do Is Tell Us When We're Doomed

"A perfected Midas would be capable of detecting the heat radiation of the huge rocket engines of a long-range ballistic missile as it ejected flame and rose into the sky."

—New York Times, May 25, "Satellite to Spot Missile Shots Put Into Orbit in Air Force Test."

Postscript

We would call attention in this connection to an Associated Press dispatch from Washington which appeared in the Baltimore Sun May 23. It quoted an unidentified "group of American experts on Soviet affairs" as being very much alarmed lest the Administration adhere to "its ban on U-2 flights over Russia." Significantly, these anonymous experts said nothing about needing the U-2 as a guard against surprise attack. They gave two reasons. One was that the flights "mapped vital targets for the Strategic Air Command." The other was "Second—and most important—the Kremlin was well aware of the U-2's role and efficiency, and respected it." This second reason seems to regard it as important to flex our muscles over Russia's skies. "Although the targets could be defined by other sources of intelligence," the AP dispatch went on to say, "the Strategic Air Command has found the U-2 thus far the best, most reliable and comprehensive tool for this purpose." Apparently the SAC likes the U-2 not only because it locates targets for it but because it does so in a way which shows the Russians we can over-fly their country. This is the "tough guy" attitude which can be so dangerously provocative in the thermonuclear age. "Some Defense Department experts," the AP said, "are reported worried by the possible reaffirmation in the United Nations Security Council of President Eisenhower's Paris announcement calling off the spy flights." They argue that since Khrushchov "rejected Eisenhower's gesture in Paris . . . the United States is no longer bound by it."

Why the Soviets Would Be Mad to Risk A Surprise Attack on the United States

"It appears that the principle obstacles to a Soviet surprise attack in the missile gap period . . . arise from the practical difficulty of effectively destroying a large number of dispersed targets almost simultaneously, a feat necessary in order to prevent a retaliatory counter-attack of major proportions on the Soviet Union.

"These targets include SAC's overseas bases, NATO tactical air forces whose planes can deliver nuclear weapons against Soviet targets of strategic importance, a handful of intermediate range missile sites in Western Europe and Britain, and those U.S. naval carriers in position to launch strategic attacks. The number of these weapons that might escape destruction from Soviet missiles and aircraft . . . poses a retaliatory threat that should introduce a note of caution into Soviet calculations. No sane government would view lightly the placing of even a dozen thermonuclear bombs on its major cities.

"The execution of a coordinated surprise attack presents an additional element of uncertainty, as many of the preparatory moves could give the show away if misphased. If the first Soviet intermediate range missiles, for example, struck one of our overseas airbases even 20 minutes ahead of an ICBM strike against SAC's domestic fields, a force of several hundred U.S. bombers (now on 15-minute 'ground alert') could be airborne and on their way to Soviet targets before their bases were destroyed."

—Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on U.S. Strategy, Report No. 8 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 6, 1959, p. 55.

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12 Congressmen and 46 Scholars Join in Launching A New "Liberal Project"

New Liaison Between Progressives and the Learned Community

A new effort to bring about close liaison in policy formulation between liberals in Congress and liberals in the learned community made its public debut here last week with the release by *The Liberal Project* of a foreign policy study by James P. Warburg. This is to be the first in a series of special studies in basic policy questions. These are to be published as "The Liberal Papers" early in the Fall. The Liberal Project also expects to circulate a 70-page booklet with a draft platform and general policy recommendations for the Democratic Party at its convention in July.

The core of the new group are 12 Congressmen aided by 46 scholars (see box below) in various fields. The aim is not to form a new action group competitive with Americans for Democratic Action nor to organize a Congressional "bloc." The strategy is to keep the group small enough so that it can hammer out specific programs without too much of the "watering down" process inevitable in collective action and use these to stimulate public discussion.

From the Liberal Project Manifesto

"The 1958 elections brought to Washington 57 new Democratic Congressmen who, for the most part, were elected because the American people felt that a new kind of leadership and new ideas were desperately needed in politics. . . . As part of this resurgence a group of Congressmen has joined together with a distinguished group of scientists, scholars and experts to formulate new domestic and international policies applicable to the 1960's. This group and its work has come to be known as the Liberal Project . . . to formulate a positive political position which will seek solutions that are not tainted with political opportunism or false moderation."

A German Solution Bypassed By Events

The Warburg foreign policy paper contains few surprises for those familiar with the work of this gifted long-time crusader for a more humane and rational foreign policy. Unfortunately parts of it, notably on the German question, appear to be "dated" not merely by the breakdown of the summit but by Russian attitudes obvious many months ago. Mr. Warburg's formulation, that the U.S. must decide between "a German military contribution to NATO or the reunification of the two German states" seems to have become obsolete. German Social Democrats with whom I spoke in Bonn last year after their visit to Moscow came back with the bleak view that the Russians were no longer interested in reunification but only in obtaining Western recognition of a permanently split Reich. Mr. Warburg advocates a variant of the Rapacki plan, calling for a neutral belt in Central Europe, with the U.S. offering to withdraw behind the Rhine if the Russians withdraw behind the Oder. Though these solutions look wistfully utopian at the moment, Mr. Warburg's presentation and analysis are trenchant and may help to pave the way for meaningful negotiation.

In the Far East, Mr. Warburg is for admission of Communist China to the United Nations if it reaffirms the renunciation-of-force pledge it took at Bandung. He advocates withdrawal from the offshore islands, a 5-year UN trusteeship over Taiwan and then a plebiscite to determine whether the population wants to be independent or join mainland China. He admits, "This solution will at first appeal neither to Peking nor to the Nationalist regime on Taiwan," but would use as a bargaining point U.S. readiness to withdraw from Okinawa and Japan "at the appropriate phase of universal disarmament."

Like any effort to rearrange the realities of international life more sensibly, this has an inevitable flavor of pie-in-the-sky. The report is perhaps most utopian where most painfully true—in its discussion of disarmament. "So long as nations subject to no supra-national law possess any offensive armaments whatever," Mr. Warburg writes, "we believe that wars will recur." Mr. Warburg's solution, universal disarmament coupled with a new world organization that can *enforce* law, may be unattainable but short of that the problem of war looks insoluble.

Membership of the Newly Formed "Liberal Project" to Map New U.S. Policies

Twelve Democratic Congressmen: Robert W. Kastenmeier, Wis., chairman; Byron Johnson, Col.; George Kasem, Cal.; Clem Miller, Cal.; Wm. Meyer, Vt.; Wm. Moorehead, Pa.; James O'Hara, Mich.; Charles Porter, Ore.; Henry Reuss, Wis.; James Roosevelt, Cal.; Frank Thompson, N.J.; Leonard G. Wolf, Iowa. Marcus G. Raskin, Group Secretary.

Non-Congressional Participants: Hannah Arendt, philosopher; Thurman Arnold, former Federal Appeals judge; Clarence Ayres, U. of Texas Prof., Governor of Federal Reserve Board; Daniel Bell, Columbia; Merwin Bohan, specialist in Latin America and former Ambassador; Kenneth Boulding, author of The Economics of Disarmament, Univ. of Michigan; Stuart Chase, economist; Willard Cochrane, president of Farm Economics Association, Dean of Agriculture, Univ. of Minn.; John Cogley, former editor, The Commonweal.

Kingsley Davis, sociologist; Vera Micheles Dean, Foreign Policy Assoc.; Reuel Denney, Univ. of Chicago; Clark Eichelberger; Oscar Ewing, former head of Federal Security Administration; John Hope Franklin, Brooklyn College; Erich Fromm; Paul Goodman, novelist and social scientist; David Haber, Prof. of Law, Rutgers; Stuart Hughes, Harvard; Robert M. Hutchins, head of the Fund for the Republic; Erich Kahler, philosopher, author of Man, The Measure, erstwhile member Institute for Advanced Study; Simon Kuznets, economist; Harold Lasswell, Yale.

Alexander Liveright, director adult education, Univ. of Chicago; Michael Maccoby, ass't to dean of faculty, Harvard; Myres McDougal, Prof. of Law, Yale; S. L. A. Marshall, General (ret), military analyst; Seymour Melman, engineer and specialist in disarmament controls; Martin Meyerson, MIT, Harvard; Walter Millis; F. S. C. Northrop, Yale; Nathaniel Peffer, Columbia; Thomas Phillips, General (ret) and military analyst.

Eugene Rabinowitch, editor Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; David Riesman, Harvard; Fred Rodell, Yale; Bernard Schwartz, New York Univ.; Edward Shils, Chicago; Harvey Swados, novelist; Frank Tannenbaum, Columbia; Harold Taylor, former pres. Sarah Lawrence; Immanuel Wallerstein, Columbia; James P. Warburg; Norbert Wiener; Kurt Wolff, Brandeis; Quincy Wright, Univ. of Virginia.

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Eisenhower Joins Khrushchev In Switching to A Moderate Line

Mr. Eisenhower's TV report on the collapse of the summit was as feeble in its explanations of the U-2 flight as his hold on the controls of the government he heads. But his almost wistfully moderate reaction to the Soviet attacks upon him are praiseworthy and hopeful. The key to the world situation, as the President well said, lies in the catastrophic nature of a nuclear war. "Recognition of this mutual destructive capability," Mr. Eisenhower said, "is the basic reality of our present relations." He pledged continuance of present negotiations on disarmament and testing undeterred "by bad deportment" and he remains convinced that "the basic longings of the Soviet people are much like our own." These longings are frustrated, however, when slipshod handling of the reins in the White House undercuts the Kremlin moderates and plays into the hands of the Stalinists.

Germans Make Trouble on Both Sides

We hope the tone of Mr. Eisenhower's address will bring Soviet propagandists to their senses. To confuse Mr. Eisenhower with Adenauer is to play into the latter's hands. Folly and accident not malevolence and design explain his handling of the U-2 affair. We were also happy to see that Mr. Khrushchov, after his violent and vulgar press conference in Paris, calmed down in East Berlin, much to the disappointment of the East German Communists. These, like the West German leaders, are alike in favoring tough policies which can only increase world tension. The Soviet Premier's East Berlin speech, taken in conjunction with the President's, should encourage UN efforts at mediation. Mr. Khrushchov said he would do nothing to aggravate the situation and added that "the Western States, our partners at the summit conference, must understand our position correctly. For their part they also must abide by the principle not to permit any unilateral moves that would prevent the heads-of-government meeting in six or eight months' time." This in our opinion means above all no moves to give nuclear arms to the West Germans. This makes particularly disturbing the interview given the Associated Press in Paris May 19 by "a high official" of NATO forecasting an easing of the arms restrictions on West Germany in view of the summit failure. Such a step, consistent with Adenauer's plan, would darken any prospects for resumed negotiations.

Happy Ending

"In the light of the blowup of the long-awaited summit meeting and a grim turn for the worse in the international situation last week, the stock market staged a remarkable performance. . . . Traders decided that the 'cold war' was due to heat up. . . . This logically led to renewed investor interest . . . in the stocks of companies engaged in some aspect of military work—notably, aircraft, electronics and missiles. . . . The upshot was the most exciting week for the stock market in many months. . . . It was a week in which, after many months of disappointment and confusion, the bulls received strong encouragement. The news turned out, after all, to be good news."

—Financial survey, New York Times, Sun. May 22.

Stevenson Takes the Lead

In his United Nations presentation, too, Gromyko showed signs of a cooling-off process and Henry Cabot Lodge was kept significantly restrained. Whether the situation has developed beyond repair in the near future is the question, however. Rockefeller's sudden "availability" as a candidate opens a challenge from the right to Eisenhower's summitry and desire to hold the arms race within bounds. Adlai Stevenson's courage in speaking out, on the other hand, seem to be giving him the leadership he deserves but it is much too early to predict that the bulk of the Democrats will form ranks behind him. Truman and Symington still believe that the answer to the summit collapse is stepped up arms spending in an effort to reach a new "situation of strength." Fulbright is playing a cautious game midway between Lyndon Johnson and Adlai Stevenson. The revolt of 57 House Democrats led by Kowalski of Connecticut who demand clear answers to the questions raised by the U-2 fiasco is most encouraging. There are signs of a national awakening which Stevenson could lead toward peace. *7 p.m. May 25*

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